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Groups, Networks, and Hierarchy in Household Private Transfers:  




Although economists have extensively studied private transfers exchanged among 
households within a network, those exchanged directly with groups to which the 
household belongs – such as ritual gifts, communal work, and church donations – have 
received very limited attention. Using original household survey data gathered in rural 
Fiji, this paper shows that extant studies on across-household private transfers are 
incomplete for two reasons. First, group-based transfers are much greater than network-
based transfers because of significant contributions to groups for their provision of local 
public goods. Second, group-based transfers significantly influence network-based 
transfers through the social hierarchy: A comparison of various groups (e.g., kin and 
church groups) and social ranks (e.g., gender, disability, elite kin, and religious elite) 
indicates that network-based transfers adjust to hierarchy bias in group-based transfers 
among fixed members depending on the physical and social connections of groups and 
networks.  
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1.  Introduction 
Roles of communities, groups, and networks in development are a central theme 
that development economists often address (Barrett, 2005). Private transfers are one of 
the most direct forms of social interaction. Although economists have extensively studied 
private transfers exchanged among households within a network (see, for example, Cox 
and Fafchamps, 2008 for review), those exchanged directly with groups to which the 
household belongs – such as ritual gifts, communal work, and church donations – have 
received very limited attention. I argue that extant studies on across-household transfers 
are incomplete for two reasons. First, the latter group-based transfers can be much greater 
than the former network-based transfers, because significant contributions are made to 
groups for their provision of local public goods, such as social activities and village 
upkeep. Second, these two forms of transfers can be tightly linked with each other. In 
particular, group-based transfers may significantly influence network-based transfers 
through the social hierarchy: As members’ social ranks (e.g., elite status) affect group-
based transfers, individual households may adjust network-based transfers in a way to 
counteract this hierarchy bias. This is because although group membership is often 
exogenously determined by kinship, heredity, and eligibility, household transfer networks 
are endogenously formed by individual households.  
This paper generates empirical evidence for these conjectures. In particular, the 
comparison of various groups and social ranks discussed shortly indicates that the 
adjustment to hierarchy depends on the physical and social connections of groups and 
networks. The paper echoes the work of Cox and Fafchamps (2008), who call for 
broadening the study of determinants of private transfers beyond income, which has been 
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a dominant focus of extant works that explore transfer motives and crowding-out; while 
they emphasize demographics, I focus on groups and hierarchy. 
The empirical analysis exploits original household survey data I gathered in the 
following two major village subgroups in rural Fiji. First, in Fiji and other Pacific island 
states, kinship underlies gift exchange not only among households through networks, but 
also between each household and the kin group to which it belongs, for securing social 
status and showing commitment to the group (Malinowski, 1922; Mauss, 1967). Indeed, 
following Malinowski’s (1922) seminal work on gifts and reciprocity in Melanesia, most 
related anthropological studies have been conducted in the Pacific region (Hann, 2006). 
Second, development agents are increasingly recognizing community groups – such as 
women’s groups and school groups – as essential local partners for implementing 
community-based development projects (Heyer et al., 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; 
World Bank, 2002). Bernard et al. (2008) assess the existence of village organizations, 
their performance, and members’ participation in benefits in Senegal and Burkina Faso; 
Okten and Osili (2004) analyze household contributions to community organizations in 
Indonesia with a focus on ethnic diversity within the organizations; and Imai and Eklund 
(2008) examine the roles of women’s community-based organizations in child health in 
Papua New Guinea. Christianity also underlies Fijian society, and church donations are 
quite significant. Religious networks may be as important as kin networks in household 
private transfers.      
Hierarchy in Fijian society is determined by various ranks. Turner (1992, p. 291) 
highlights the roles of age, kin elite, and gender: 
Hierarchy is defined here as the ranking of the elements of a whole (society) in 
relation to the whole. In this sense, the elements that are ranked are social 
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categories or positions defined in terms of age, seniority of descent, and gender, 
and the whole in relation to which they are ranked is a social system grounded in 
ritual. Elder is superior to junior, chief to commoner, and male to female. But 
while age, rank, and gender differences entail relations of superiority/inferiority 
among persons, they also create interdependence. . . . These relations of inequality 
and interdependence (which do not preclude conflict) are expressed and 
reproduced in the practice of everyday life.  
 
Community-group leaders who play major roles in development, social, and/or 
humanitarian activities are also likely to hold a high rank, as religious leaders do. 
Disability may signify a low rank, as the disabled are often considered to be particularly 
disadvantaged in developing countries with limited public safety nets, though research on 
disability among the poor is scant (Yeo and Moore, 2003). A unique feature of the Fijian 
data is that because households in each village are stratified by their kin group and elite 
status, direct measures of elite status are available. In standard household surveys, in 
contrast, elite status is often unobservable to researchers, and even if it is observable, 
there are too few elites to make a statistical analysis possible.  
Two other features of the Fijian data are to be noted. First, distinct from many 
extant studies, transfer measures capture not only cash and inkind (e.g., food, handicrafts), 
but also labor time. This is crucial for group-based transfers, which often contain 
significant labor-time contributions to groups (e.g. communal work). Second, the paper 
focuses on domestic private transfers. This is simply because, distinct from extant studies 
in the Pacific region (Bertram, 1986; World Bank, 2006), overseas remittances are almost 
nonexistent in my study area in Fiji’s remote islands.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a description of 
the data and groups. Section 3 compares group- and network-based transfers, showing 
that their main difference is contributions to groups for their provision of local public 
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goods. Section 4 explores the group-network connection in a descriptive manner. Section 
5 discusses the econometric specification and hierarchy measures to test the hypothesized 
link of group- and network-based transfers. Estimation results are reported in Section 6. 
The last section concludes.      
2.  Data and groups  
In 2005 I conducted surveys among native Fijian households in Cakaudrove 
Province (Fiji is divided almost evenly between native Fijians and Indo-Fijians). The 
province is mainly located on Vanua Levu Island and Taveuni Island, the second- and 
third-largest islands in the country, which significantly lag behind the largest island, Viti 
Levu, where the state capital, two international airports, and most tourism businesses are 
situated. The province has 134 villages in 16 districts. In each district, I purposefully 
chose 43 villages to cover distinct environmental, economic, and social conditions. While 
the data represent neither the province nor the nation, the villages in the sample well 
capture various types of villages in Fiji’s underdeveloped islands. In each village, 
households were stratified by the smallest kin group unit (defined shortly), as well as by 
the combination of leadership status (defined in Section 5) and major asset holdings (e.g., 
shops), and households were randomly sampled in each stratum (50% on average). 
Overall, the survey covered 906 households. 
Kin groups 
Each native Fijian belongs to a lineage of the vanua-yavusa-mataqali-tokatoka 
hierarchy: Vanua consists of several yavusa; yavusa consists of several mataqali; and 
mataqali consists of several tokatoka (Ravuvu, 1983). While vanua ranges over several 
villages, yavusa is mostly formed within the village; in another words, village formation 
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is largely based on yavusa. The dominant symbol of Fijian culture is kava (a beverage 
infused from the root of a pepper plant, Piper methysticum), and kava rituals frequently 
involve exchanges of ceremonial goods, such as food, mats, and bark cloth (Turner, 
1987). Many ritual activities, such as funerals and weddings, are organized by mataqali 
and yavusa; vanua occasionally hold large traditional meetings. Kin groups also underlie 
household income-generating activities: Land is communally owned by mataqali (about 
83% of the country’s total land is communal), and customary rights for coastal fishing are 
held by vanua or several yavusa. The sample covers 20 vanua, 53 yavusa, 146 mataqali, 
and 234 tokatoka; an average village in the sample consists of 1.2 yavusa, 3.4 mataqali, 
and 5.6 tokatoka; and on average, each yavusa, mataqali, and tokatoka consists of 40, 14, 
and 8 households, respectively (see Table 1).  
Community groups 
Church, women’s, school, and youth groups are four major types of community 
groups, and their distributions and memberships are distinct from each other. A church 
group formed for each church, which often covers more than one village, is available in 
all villages – 3.3 church groups per village on average – and almost all households are 
members (church membership is largely based on heredity). Village church groups have 
strong ties with larger groups in the same sect. In contrast, if there are any non-religious 
community groups in a village at all, there is usually just one for each type. Membership 
in non-religious community groups is based on eligibility – gender, child schooling, and 
age –, and accordingly, fewer individuals belong to them than to a church. While 
membership is almost uniform among the eligible for school groups, such is not the case 
for women’s and youth groups. The school group formed for each school can cover more 
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than one village, while women’s and youth groups are village based. The data lack 
information about the number of school groups in the village and the group-level 
membership of community groups; in particular, there is no information to indicate the 
particular church group to which each individual belongs.  
3.  Differences between group- and network-based transfers  
My first argument is that group-based transfers are greater than network-based 
transfers, mainly because of household contributions to groups for their provision of local 
public goods, such as social activities and village upkeep. Because the Fijian data do not 
allow me to directly tell which contributions are actually used for public goods provision, 
I offer indirect, descriptive evidence supporting this conjecture.  
Group-based transfers 
Respondents were asked about the transfers – in the form of cash, inkind, and 
labor time, separately – they contributed to and received directly from each kin and 
community group discussed in the last section, as well as the village, in the past year. 
These group-based transfer data are unbalanced in coverage between receipt and giving: 
While the transfers that the household offers to groups contain all the resources the 
household contributes, those it receives from the group capture only partial benefits, 
excluding those of local public goods that the group provides. Directly measuring such 
benefits is very difficult, because they often include unobservable social and cultural 
benefits and can be heterogeneous across households.  
This imbalance in the data is reflected in aggregate transfer patterns: While almost 
all households make contributions to some groups, 42% of households receive transfers 
from at least one group; the mean amount of transfers in any form given to all groups 
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combined is more than six times those received from them (see panel A of Table 2). On 
the net, an average household makes cash-inkind contributions to groups by F$1,619 
(=1,934–315), or 9% of its pre-transfer earned income (F$1 = US$.60).
1 An average 
household also contributes 47 man-days of labor time, which is equivalent to 5% of its 
labor-time endowment (the mean number of working adults is 3.1 and annual labor-time 
endowment per working adult is assumed to be 300 days), or 7% of its pre-transfer 
income (labor time is monetized based on men’s daily wage in each village, the mean of 
which is F$16).  
Since transfers made for within-group and across-group reallocations of resources 
in the village are roughly balanced, a major part of household contributions to groups 
should be used for their provision of local public goods.
2 This is supported by two pieces 
of evidence. First, the importance of labor-time transfers relative to cash-inkind is much 
greater in giving than in receipt. Second, the most common reason reported by 
respondents (in both receipt and giving) is ritual – a category containing significant 
public goods components. Table 3 shows proportions of reasons reported by respondents 
for each transfer (proportions are calculated using transfer amounts as weights, and if 
there is more than one reason for the same transfer, equal weights are assigned among 
them).   
Disaggregate transfer patterns are also consistent with the significance of 
household contributions for public goods. While transfers received from kin groups and 
contributed to community groups are the most common and largest, the importance of 
labor-time transfers relative to cash-inkind is the greatest for the village (over 60%) 
(results not shown). When only members of each community group are considered, 
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almost all make contributions, and church donations and school contributions are large. 
Correspondingly, general contributions – another category containing a significant public 
goods components – to community groups as well as the village are as common as ritual; 
in contrast, ritual dominates kin group transfers (almost two thirds in both receipt and 
giving) (results not shown).
3 Members receive almost no transfers from non-religious 
community groups, which presumably concentrate on the provision of public goods.  
Network-based transfers 
Respondents were also asked about each major transfer received from and given 
to other households in the past year.
4 These standard across-household transfer data are 
balanced in coverage between receipt and giving. While transfers received from other 
households are about twice as much as those received from groups, those given to other 
households are only about one fifth of those contributed to groups. The following patterns 
in contrast to group-based transfers are consistent with my conjecture that public-goods 
provision can be mainly distinguished between group- and network-based transfers. 
Participation in cash-inkind transfers – both receipt and giving – are almost uniform; the 
mean amount of cash-inkind transfers is about four times that of monetized labor-time 
transfers; and an average household is a net recipient of cash-inkind transfers, but not 
labor-time transfers (panel B of Table 2). The most common reason is 
consumption/expenditure, a category that captures public goods components less than 
ritual and general contributions (Table 3).  
4.  Connection between groups and networks 
My second argument is that group- and network-based transfers are tightly linked 
with each other. This section offers descriptive evidence for the connection between 
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groups and networks. Respondents were asked about the characteristics of households 
with which transfers were made. An average household exchanged transfers with 3.6 
households in its network, approximately 80%, 70%, and 80% of whom are in the same 
village, the same tokatoka (closest kin), and the same church group, respectively. It is 
thus clear that physical and social proximities are major determinants of network 
formation (as found by Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007 in the Philippines). An important 
new finding is that social distance is determined not only by kinship, but also by religion.  
Kin and religious connections are distinct from each other. On the one hand, with 
the hierarchical structure of kin groups in the village, how kinship matters in group- and 
network-based transfers depends on the closeness of kin relationships: The tokatoka 
network is more important than the tokatoka group, and the comparison is the opposite 
for mataqali, yavusa, and vanua. In particular, transfers received from tokatoka are almost 
negligible, and household contributions to tokatoka are half of transfers given to other 
households in the same tokatoka; at the same time, transfers received from other 
households in the same tokatoka are over two times those from all kin groups (Table 2). 
It appears that the difference between the tokatoka group and the tokatoka network is 
blurred, as one third of households in the same tokatoka in the village are also part of the 
transfer network.
5 In contrast, households belonging to the same kin group higher than 
tokatoka are relatively uncommon in the network, and transfers exchanged directly with 
such kin groups are large (transfers contributed to all kin groups are twice as much as 
those given to other households in the same tokatoka).  
On the other hand, there is no hierarchy among church groups in the village, and 
both church groups and church networks are important for giving and receipt, 
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respectively: Household contributions to its church group are 1.5 times as much as 
transfers given to other households in the same church group; transfers received from 
other households in the same church group are 10 times those received directly from the 
church group.   
In- and out-of-village networks 
While group-based transfers are mostly made within the village, transfers 
exchanged with households in other villages or in another city, but not in another country, 
are more significant than suggested from relatively uncommon out-of-village networks. 
First of all, while within-village transfers are much more common and larger than across-
village transfers, transfers (mostly cash-inkind) received from households outside the 
village are twice as common and four times larger than those given (they are actually 
similar to cash-inkind transfers received from all groups in the village); in contrast, 
within-village transfers are balanced between receipt and giving in both participation and 
amount (Table 2). This means that the net transfers received from other households at the 
aggregate level found above mostly come from out-of-village networks. An average 
household received 38% of transfers from 20% of households in its out-of-village 
network, i.e., the mean net across-village transfer received per partner household is about 
2.5 times that of the within-village counterpart ((38%/20%)/(62%/80%)). There is no 
such difference in transfer amount per partner household between transfers made within 
and outside the same tokatoka or church group.  
Out-of-village networks are mainly formed by close kin and religious 
relationships. Consistent with the comparison of within- and across-village transfers, an 
average household is a net recipient in its tokatoka network as well as in its out-of-kin 
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network (consisting of households belonging to other vanua outside the village); in 
contrast, transfers in its mataqali/yavusa/vanua network are balanced between receipt and 
giving. An average household is a net recipient both in and out of the church network.   
5.  Hierarchy and transfer linkage - econometric specification  
I argue that network-based transfers counteract the hierarchy bias in group-based 
transfers. The last section showed that these two are linked through the physical and 
social connections of groups and networks and that transfers received through out-of-
village networks are also considerable. I thus conjecture the following. First, the 
adjustment in network-based transfers to the hierarchy bias in group-based transfers is 
stronger outside the village than in the village, because out-of-village networks are less 
tightly connected with in-village groups than in-village networks are. Second, the 
adjustment to social ranks that are not formed by groups is stronger than those formed by 
kin and church groups, because groups and networks are socially connected by kinship 
and religion.  
Identifying how group-based transfers biased by social ranks alter network-based 
transfers is very difficult, because these two are simultaneously determined. Instead I test 
the following hypotheses consistent with my conjectures.    
Hypothesis 1: Network- and group-based transfers are affected by social ranks in 
opposite ways, and this is more strongly so in out-of-village networks than in-
village networks.  
Hypothesis 2: Network-based transfers are more strongly affected by social ranks 
that are not formed by groups than those formed by groups.  
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These hypotheses can be straightforwardly tested by estimating the effects of various 
social ranks on network- and group-based transfers in a comparable manner. Though 
adjustments in network-based transfers can occur in either network formation or transfer 
exchange in the network, or both, distinguishing between these two is beyond the scope 
of this paper. I first discuss the econometric specification and then detail social ranks.  
Econometric specification 
I employ the following standard transfer equation:  
i i i i e V Z X y + + + + = γ β α ,         ( 1 )  
where yi is household i’s net transfers received from other households, gross transfers 
received from groups, or gross transfers given to groups; Xi is household social rank, as 
defined below; Zi is other household characteristics, such as shock, demographic factors, 
asset holdings, and public transfers; V is village dummies, which control for all village 
factors, such as location, village size, and inequality; and ei is an error term.  
Two clarifications are needed. First, earned income is not controlled for in 
equation (1). For net transfers received from other households, this is the only difference 
from many extant works in the literature. My goal is to identify the impact of social ranks, 
not that of earned income. To the extent that permanent income that can be correlated 
with social ranks is controlled for by demographic factors and asset holdings, omitted 
earned income does not cause bias. In contrast, earned income is endogenous as a 
determinant of household private transfers, because, in anticipation of private transfers, it 
may adjust earning efforts (i.e., decisions of earning and transfers are made 
simultaneously), and any unobservable factors that are correlated with earned income, 
such as skills, may also influence its transfer decisions. Controlling for income 
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endogeneity is infeasible with these data, which lack valid instrumental variables (cf. 
Jensen, 2004; Juarez, 2009; Kazianga, 2006).  
  Second, the same transfer equation (1) is used for group-based transfers. My goal 
is not to dissect group mechanisms determining transfers, but to show how household 
social ranks alter transfer outcomes. For estimations comparable with network-based 
transfers, equation (1) can be used for group-based transfers with the following caveats. 
Distinct from across-household transfers, transfers received from and given to groups 
need to be separately estimated, because their decisions are made by different agents and 
what they cover is unbalanced in the data. It is important to control for group factors, 
such as group size and inequality, because they can be correlated with social ranks 
formed in the group. When aggregate transfers made with multiple groups in the village 
are considered, however, it is not straightforward to construct aggregate group-level 
measures, though village dummies still control for the combination of group factors 
common in the village.   
When participation in transfers is almost uniform, I employ Ordinary Least-
Squares (OLS) to estimate equation (1); otherwise, I first estimate the determinants of 
participation using probit for the entire sample and then those of the amount among 
participants using OLS. This is a two-part, or hurdle, model commonly used in previous 
works on private and public transfers (e.g., Dercon and Krishnan, 2005; Jayne et al., 
2002); a tobit model with a restrictive assumption that coefficients are the same between 
the participation and amount equations yields qualitatively similar results. An alternative 
sample selection model is infeasible with these data, which lack the identifying 
instruments required to credibly estimate the selection equation.  
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Hierarchy measures 
I compare the following eight social ranks. Age, gender, and disability are ranks 
not formed by groups. They are measured by the age and gender of household head and 
the disability status of any household member (in the sample, the mean age is 51 years, 
9% of households are headed by females, and 21% of households have at least one 
disabled member, according to respondents’ subjective assessments).  
Group-based ranks are categorized into two: kin and non-kin elite status. In Fiji, 
traditional permanent leadership positions determine individual and kin group status. 
Highly ranked vanua chiefs and yavusa/mataqali chiefs assume traditional duties across 
villages and within the village, respectively (there is no takatoka chief). Yavusa and 
mataqali chiefs, some of whom are also a vanua chief, are available only in highly ranked 
yavusa and mataqali (chief’s kin) (27% of households belong to chief’s mataqali, see 
Table 1). Kin leaders, including chiefs, play a major role in the kin group’s decision-
making and negotiations among groups in the village (3%, 11%, and 18% of households 
have yavusa, mataqali, and tokatoka leaders, respectively).
6 Village chiefs are shared by 
some kin leaders and are not necessarily yavusa/mataqali chiefs. As such, kin elite status 
is measured by two dummies: chief’s kin defined by mataqali and kin leaders of any 
group. Using chief’s kin defined by tokatoka yields very similar results (recall that 
yavusa is a group very close to the village).  
Another important village position is the gatekeeper (turaga ni koro), who 
handles most matters in connection with the local government (receiving information and 
materials from the government and non-governmental organizations, distributing them to 
villagers, and coordinating village meetings). Gatekeepers and community group leaders 
   
   16
are neither permanent nor directly related to kinship. Approximately 3% of households 
have village leaders (village chiefs and gatekeepers combined), church leaders, women’s 
leaders, and youth leaders, respectively (information about school leaders is lacking) 
(Table 1). Non-kin elite status is measured by three dummies: church leader, women’s 
leader, and other non-kin leader. The last combines gatekeeper and youth leader 
(capturing these two separately is infeasible, as there are a limited number of them).  
A comparison of age, gender, and disability reveals which ranks matter most, and 
a similar comparison can be made among different group-based elite ranks. I also analyze 
kin groups, village, and community groups separately, thus capturing potential across-
group linkage through the social hierarchy – elite status formed by one group may also 
affect other groups. These analyses can lead to important policy implications by showing 
who is most disadvantaged and who is most influential.  
My focus is on comparing hierarchy biases, not explaining each one. The 
theoretical prediction of the impact of each rank is ambiguous. Even if households with a 
low status (e.g., female head) are shown to receive greater private transfers, which motive 
operates it is unknown: It may be altruism helping the disadvantaged or a result of 
exchanges with more “services” offered by them (Cox, 1987). Similarly, households with 
a high status (e.g., church leader) may appear to be favored because of the exchange 
motive, cultural norms that prioritize them, or a result of misappropriation; households 
with another high status (e.g., kin leader) may instead appear to be disfavored as a result 
of the exchange motive or reputation building.   
6.  Hierarchy and transfer linkage – estimation results  
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Estimation results of the eight social rank variables are reported in Table 4 – 
estimated marginal effects at means for the probit in panel A and estimated coefficients 
for the OLS in panel B.
7 Participation is almost uniform for gross transfers given to all 
groups and community groups and net transfers received from all other households and 
those in the same village (the corresponding columns in panel A are thus blank); 
participation in other group-based transfers is not uniform (Table 2). The dummy for 
women’s leader is excluded in the amount equations for transfers received from groups, 
because of the limited number of women’s leaders among recipients (when women’s 
leaders are combined with other non-kin leaders, almost the same results are obtained). 
These are results for cash-inkind and monetized labor-time transfers combined; separate 
results for each are also discussed when they exhibit important distinct patterns. I discuss 
results for the group-network linkage hypothesized in the last section and the comparison 
of age, gender, and disability first, and then those of the across-group linkage.     
Group-network linkage   
Age, gender, and disability strongly affect group-based transfers. Households with 
an old head receive a larger amount from and contribute a smaller amount to groups, 
especially kin groups; female-headed households are more likely to be recipients of 
transfers from all three groups, are less likely to contribute to kin groups, and contribute a 
smaller amount to the village; and in contrast, households with a disabled member are 
less likely to participate in transfers with kin groups and the village (both receipt and 
giving), and they receive a smaller amount from the village. Hence, kin groups and the 
village treat females and the disabled in opposite ways in their reallocation of resources 
within the group. The disabled are strongly disfavored. While females are favored in all 
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groups in the village, the elderly are favored in kin groups only weakly (the marginal 
effect of age is F$6.6 per year). Corresponding to these hierarchy biases, households with 
an old head and a disabled member rely more on their out-of-village networks. Observe 
that while households with an old head, a female head, and a disabled member receive 
greater net transfers from other households (column 9), when only within-village 
transfers are considered (column 10), the estimated coefficient of age becomes very small 
and loses statistical significance, that of gender does not change, and that of disability 
halves. That is, network-based transfers respond to age, gender, and disability outside the 
village, within the village, and both, respectively. These findings are consistent with 
hypothesis 1.  
While kin leaders contribute more to kin groups (but are not large recipients) and 
church leaders are more likely to be recipients of transfers and receive a greater amount 
from community groups (but are not large donors), neither of them affects network-based 
transfers. Combined with the findings on age, gender, and disability, these results 
strongly support hypothesis 2. Qualitatively the same results about church leaders are 
obtained from estimating equation (1) for church groups separately: Compared to non-
leaders, church leaders are 55% more likely to receive transfers and receive a greater 
amount by about F$260 – over six times the mean – from the church group (results not 
shown); with a lack of group-level membership information, however, no group factors 
are controlled for in this disaggregated analysis. Consistent with hypothesis 2, other non-
kin leaders that are not strongly associated with networks do not affect any transfers.   
A puzzling result of women’s leaders is that while they do not influence 
community group transfers, they do receive smaller transfers (cash-inkind) from other 
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households in the same village. The former result holds when women’s groups are 
examined separately among group members (results not shown). These results require 
caution. They might be biased if women’s leadership is correlated with unobservable 
skills and entrepreneurship, in particular, for handicraft making for both gifts and selling 
(another consistent result is obtained below). The nonsignificant result of group-based 
transfers may be the result of selection bias caused by endogenous participation in 
women’s groups (participation is not uniform among the eligible as discussed above, and 
a sample selection model is infeasible for the same reason given above). Earlier findings 
on religious elite are unlikely to be contaminated by the potential endogeneity of 
women’s leadership though, because dropping the latter variable hardly alters the results 
of the remaining variables.
8     
Across-group linkage 
Elite kin and religious elite are the most influential across groups as follows. First, 
while kin group status (chief’s kin) does not affect kin group transfers, households in 
chief’s kin, but not kin leaders, are less likely to contribute (especially labor time) to the 
village. This may be because communal labor in the village is arranged mainly among 
kin groups. Next, while households of chief’s kin receive a large amount from church 
groups, church leaders receive a smaller amount (cash-inkind) from and contribute a 
larger amount to kin groups; in contrast, church leaders are more likely to receive 
transfers from the village. These patterns may be because church membership relatively 
matches kinship in the village (proving this is infeasible with a lack of group-level 
membership data). Lastly, women’s leaders contribute more labor time to the village. 
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This may be because women’s group members – both leaders and non-leaders – play a 
significant role in village activities (e.g., handicrafts, festive meals).  
7.  Conclusion 
Using original household survey data gathered in rural Fiji, this paper provided 
evidence that (1) group-based transfers – both cash-inkind and labor time – are much 
greater than network-based transfers, mainly because of significant contributions to 
groups for their provision of local public goods, and (2) group-based transfers influence 
network-based transfers depending on the physical and social connections of groups and 
networks. In particular, network-based transfers, especially those outside the village, 
counteract the hierarchy bias in group-based transfers caused by social ranks not formed 
by groups – age, gender, and disability –, but not kin and religious-elite status, because 
the main networks are kin and religious ones. In the village, the disabled are the most 
disadvantaged; elite kin and religious elite are the most influential.   
These findings lead to the following research and policy implications. First, extant 
studies focusing on across-household transfers are incomplete. Are Pacific islands – the 
main field in which anthropologists study gifts and reciprocity – exceptional in the 
significance they place on groups? More research on group-based transfers in other 
locales is needed. Second, in lineage-based societies in the Pacific, social hierarchy 
strongly shapes people’s interactions and is likely to affect community-based 
development, with existing and newly created village organizations serving as local 
partners. Platteau and Abraham (2002) argue that community-based programs in Sub-
Saharan Africa are captured by local elites, because cultural norms restrict non-elites’ 
access to information and emphasize consensual decision-making; Bardhan and 
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Mookherjee (2000) offer a theory of elite capture. Policymakers need to pay attention to 
social ranks locally formed not only by kinship, but also by religion. Third, as the private 
redistributive mechanism for the disabled is very weak, strong public support for and 
more research on disability among the poor are greatly needed.     
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Notes
 
1 The mean earned income among sample households is F$10,374, or F$1,897 per capita. 
Almost all households employ traditional farming practices, using no mechanized 
equipment or animal traction and limited purchased inputs to produce taro, cassava, 
coconut, and kava plants. Most households engage in subsistence fishing, using lines and 
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hooks, simple spear guns, or rudimentary nets, and more commercially oriented 
fishermen use boats with engines, along with more valuable nets. Farming and fishing, 
respectively, count for 62% and 12% of household earned income. One third of 
households receive public transfers – mostly pensions – and the mean amount is only 
2.5% of earned income. 
2 Two exceptions are noted. First, contributions from members are not the only 
disposable resources for groups: Some kin groups earn incomes through land lease, 
logging concessions, and fishing licensing, and some non-kin groups (especially village) 
receive public transfers. Second, within-village reallocation and local public-goods 
provision are not the only ways for groups to use their resources: Kin and church groups 
with a hierarchical connection with larger groups outside the village make contributions 
to them (on the net). In contrast, across-group transfers in the village (see note 3 below) 
are balanced.   
3 Transfers received and given are balanced in yavusa; in contrast, transfers given to 
mataqali and tokatoka are 8-9 times the amount of transfers received from them. This 
indicates significant across-group transfers in the village along the kin hierarchy: Yavusa 
receives transfers from its subgroups. 
4 The survey also asked about informal loans. Informal loans are much smaller than gifts, 
and when informal loans are added to private transfers, results are almost the same as 
what are presented here.  
5 The analysis focuses on the kin groups to which households currently belong. Marriage 
across different kin groups is common. If the kin groups to which individuals used to 
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belong prior to marriage are considered, transfer networks further concentrate on 
tokatoka.    
6 The sample contains a very small number of vanua chiefs in an incomplete manner, 
because many vanua chiefs live in cities. All vanua chiefs in the sample share yavusa 
chiefs. 
7 Other household characteristics controlled for that are not shown include: sickness of 
any household member (capturing transitory income), household size of three age groups 
(younger than 15, between 15 and 65, and older than 65), secondary education of adult 
members, land holdings, and public transfers received (controlling for permanent income). 
Although demographics strongly affect household private transfers – households with 
more working adults receive smaller transfers from other households and contribute more 
labor time to the village and community groups, group- and network-based transfers are 
neutral to transitory and permanent incomes (as an exception, households with educated 
adults receive smaller amounts from other households in the same village). These weak 
results buttress the central roles played by social ranks in Fijians’ private transfers.  
8 Omitted group factors are unlikely to be a major source of potential bias, because 
running the same regression for women’s groups in selected villages where there is only 
one group yields very similar results. Note that in this subsample analysis, village 
dummies fully control for group factors. This approach is infeasible for church groups, 
because most villages contain more than one such group. 
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Vanua 20 1.0 (0.2) 96 (55) 100% - -
Yavusa 53 1.2 (0.6) 14 (11) 100% 3.2% 56%
Mataqali 146 3.4 (2.0) 14 (11) 100% 11% 27%
Tokatoka 234 5.6 (3.2) 8 (7) 100% 18% 18%
Village 43 1.0 (0.0) 45 (21) 100% 2.8% -
Church group 142 3.3 (2.2) - 98% 3.1% -
Women's group 47 1.1 (0.6) - 52% 2.8% -
School group - - - 60% - -
Youth group 44 1.0 (0.5) - 15% 2.6% -
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Village mean 






Proportion in sample 
households (n=900)
Population in sample villages
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Total 42% 315 (644) 99% 1934 (2413)
Cash-inkind 42% 257 (591) 99% 1221 (1634)
Labor-time (man-day) 25% 3.9 (12) 79% 51 (75)
Group type:
Kin groups 35% 188 (433) 86% 604 (990)
Village 22% 67 (191) 88% 384 (483)
Community groups 18% 61 (238) 97% 959 (1512)
Kin groups:
Vanua 16% 34 (120) 43% 113 (272)
Yavusa 34% 109 (287) 40% 111 (254)
Mataqali 11% 25 (105) 74% 232 (377)
Tokatoka 9% 19 (93) 50% 153 (299)
Community groups among group members:
1
Church 16% 41 (136) 97% 480 (788)
Women 11% 22 (81) 94% 306 (407)
School 2% 4 (43) 97% 466 (898)
Youth 1% 3 (26) 87% 298 (389)
B. Network-based transfers
Total 94% 606 (686) 88% 420 (491)
Cash-inkind 94% 481 (570) 89% 303 (354)
Labor-time (man-day) 32% 8.7 (19) 33% 8.2 (18)
Location:
Same village 89% 375 (426) 86% 363 (432)
Other village or city 37% 231 (509) 17% 56 (192)
Kin group:
Same tokatoka 82% 417 (570) 77% 303 (409)
Other tokatoka and same mataqali 14% 33 (121) 14% 30 (104)
Other mataqali and same yavusa 29% 68 (167) 28% 64 (176)
Other yavusa and same vanua 7% 17 (98) 7% 12 (76)
Other vanua 14% 73 (250) 6% 17 (104)
Community group:
Same church group 79% 413 (531) 74% 317 (412)
Not same church group 29% 186 (521) 23% 102 (328)
1
 Proportions of members are shown in Table 1.
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Number of observations vary. 
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Table 3. Reasons for household private transfers.
(n=887) Received Given Received Given
Consumption & expenditure 19% 16% 50% 52%
Ritual 57% 40% 22% 18%
Medical expense 4% 1% 4% 4%
Production & investment 1% 5% 4% 3%
General 17% 22% 16% 19%
O t h e r 2 %7 % 3 %4 %
Network-based transfers Group-based transfers
Note: These are proportions of reasons weighted by transfer amounts. If there is more than 
one reason for the same transfer, equal weights are assigned among them.    
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Table 4. Effects of social ranks on household private transfers.
All Kin Village Com-
munity




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Probit for participation - marginal effects at means.
0.002 0.002 0.003 * 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.220 *** 0.148 * 0.122 * 0.156 *** -0.092 * -0.066
(0.074) (0.082) (0.077) (0.067) (0.060) (0.056)
-0.051 -0.135 ** -0.083 * 0.028 -0.109 ** -0.087 **
(0.058) (0.058) (0.044) (0.042) (0.052) (0.048)
0.020 0.018 0.006 0.012 -0.033 -0.092 **
(0.055) (0.054) (0.044) (0.040) (0.051) (0.049)
-0.016 -0.007 -0.047 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005
(0.057) (0.060) (0.042) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036)
0.273 ** 0.089 0.345 *** 0.479 *** -0.056 0.031
(0.112) (0.127) (0.120) (0.113) (0.097) (0.061)
-0.172 -0.090 -0.138 -0.041 0.076 0.036
(0.095) (0.105) (0.056) (0.065) (0.055) (0.071)
-0.087 -0.092 -0.034 -0.063 -0.017 0.012
(0.089) (0.092) (0.070) (0.048) (0.070) (0.058)
Log likelihood -420.1 -351.6 -315.1 -313.2 -260.6 -258.5
Chi sq. (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Pseudo R sq. 0.236 0.263 0.278 0.230 0.195 0.135
No. obs. 809 714 755 823 684 707
Panel B. OLS for amounts.
7.2 * 6.6 ** 3.5 1.4 -11.7 -7.3 * -1.7 -6.4 3.9 ** 1.0
(3.7) (2.9) (2.6) (3.0) (7.6) (4.3) (2.4) (4.7) (1.9) (0.9)
-145.5 -164.0 62.8 -199.0 -138.5 -121.4 -80.7 * -91.6 134.8 * 132.6 ***
(161.2) (110.9) (81.8) (181.4) (223.5) (151.1) (46.3) (146.8) (74.3) (49.0)
0.9 -97.3 -168.7 ** 382.1 120.3 123.3 12.5 16.0 134.4 ** 58.7 **
(224.4) (124.9) (79.2) (302.4) (219.0) (142.2) (48.8) (125.8) (63.9) (27.2)
139.4 56.8 11.6 277.3 33.5 112.9 -40.6 20.4 -43.5 -3.4
(133.2) (94.0) (64.0) (185.0) (135.8) (87.3) (42.1) (83.0) (45.5) (28.3)
6.3 -69.7 88.2 34.5 100.5 287.0 * 20.6 -105.2 -19.1 4.0
(151.8) (97.3) (63.2) (128.7) (238.9) (157.5) (53.9) (121.2) (57.1) (24.5)
331.0 -322.8 *** 117.3 415.9 *** 36.2 286.6 * -89.6 -11.0 102.3 -48.3
(251.5) (119.4) (93.3) (141.9) (375.3) (163.0) (69.4) (256.2) (147.6) (45.2)
234.0 -12.8 406.6 *** 143.6 -156.8 * -209.4 ***
(537.8) (277.9) (131.1) (347.2) (89.9) (74.6)
13.3 -41.0 44.8 -43.1 -98.3 -95.4 29.4 -106.0 -86.4 -37.6
(157.6) (112.3) (71.4) (154.9) (287.6) (112.3) (87.4) (190.3) (73.4) (42.0)
F (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R squared 0.207 0.263 0.324 0.335 0.220 0.319 0.172 0.225 0.173 0.157




Note: *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. Marginal effects at means in probit estimates with standard errors in 
parentheses are shown in panel A. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses are shown in panel B: columns (1)-(4), 
(6), and (7) are for households conditional on participation, and columns (5), (8)-(10) are for the whole sample. Other controls which 
are not shown here are other household characteristics discussed in the text, village dummies, and constant.




















   
 